UNPACKING CANADA'S MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

INTRODUCTION

Amidst recent tensions between the United States and Canada, questions around military commitments have emerged as central to the discourse for the Canadian government. Externally, the Canadian government must reconcile with a clear push from the United States to increase the total funding apportioned to the Canadian military as well as its border patrol forces. Perhaps more worryingly, consistent rhetoric from the Trump administration has highlighted an underlying desire to incorporate Canada into the United States. While much of the communication from American officials has focused on persuasion, through highlighting benefits, statements have been made that can be potentially considered threats to Canada’s territorial sovereignty. Given the United States' significant economic and military advantage, there is growing concern within Canada over how to best reconceptualise the historical relationship between these two powers, and a need to develop strategic plans to address the possibility of an outright annexation attempt.

This raises a key challenge for Canada: how does it address its historical dependence on the United States in the defence sector? In light of recent concerns over the possibility of United States aggression, the historically close relationship between the two states has shifted rather starkly from being a military asset to being a liability.

As the Carney government looks to redraw the boundaries of the relationship with the Trump administration, it has made firm commitments to increase its defence expenditure with the goal of protecting Canadians. Crucially, considerations around separating the Canadian military and defence infrastructure from American influence also seem to be top of mind for the regime - with Carney committing to 2.1 billion aimed at strengthening the relationship with the Canadian defence industry, as well as 2 billion to facilitate partnerships with strategic partners other than the United States1.

While these commitments represent a welcome attempt to develop a Canadian military that is not dependent on a singular foreign power, there is currently a paucity of scholarship that examines the extent to which the United States exerts influence over Canada’s military and defence sectors. With this in mind, this literature review seeks to examine existing literature on the subject in order to best identify the various verticals wherein the United States has significant influence over Canadian military and defence operations.

ANALYSIS

In the absence of academic scholarship on the subject, this analysis will focus predominantly on the use of grey literature, public communique and news reporting. For the purpose of this analysis, four key verticals have been focused on: Joint Military Commands and Operations, Munitions and Equipment, Surveillance, and Training.

1. Joint Military Commands and Joint Operations

At the outset, it is critical to note the unique military relationship shared between Canada and the United States. At a formal level, the United States and Canada have entered into the world’s first binational military command, known as the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).2 The NORAD agreement was renewed in perpetuity in 2006, and its mandate was extended to include the implementation of maritime warning systems. Given the interconnected nature of NORAD, therefore, it is critical to understand the extent to which Canada’s reliance on it is dependent on the United States.

The first consideration is around funding. At present, there is little publicly available data on the amount of funding that has been provided to NORAD by the United States. While Canada has pledged around 70 billion for NORAD modernisation over the next 20 years, historical data shows that its investment has lagged behind its southern counterpart.3 For example, the United States recently bore most of the cost of a new artificial intelligence system known as Pathfinder that was set to be used by NORAD personnel. Despite the absence of clear evidence around the United States’ financial contribution, it is clear that it represents a challenge for the Canadian military should that funding be halted or disrupted.

Crucially, an important structural consideration here is that despite being a binational command, NORAD as an entity does not own any of the assets it uses - rather, they are owned by their respective militaries. This raises key concerns over the use of critical systems by Canadian forces that are, in actuality, owned by the United States military. For example, a report published by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence examining the collaborations between the Canadian and United States military highlighted the example of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWCS).4 The report notes that the Canadian military does not possess the necessary capacity and infrastructure to implement AWCS systems and instead relies on the use of the American system. While the report highlights this as an example of the successful benefits of collaboration, the existence of current tensions has shifted this paradigm significantly.

Beyond the concrete example of NORAD, and perhaps more worryingly, the mid-2010s saw the revelation that the Canadian military was considering substantially greater integration with the United States military. Internal communication that was made available through the Access to Information Act highlighted how the Canadian government had begun to explore the possibility of establishing a binational integrated military force that could be deployed to strategic zones.5 In fact, further reporting revealed that this plan even included for the possibility of a total integration between the Canadian and United States military.6 While these plans were ultimately shelved, they provide a key indicator as to the extent to which the two militaries have historically viewed each other as being closely linked and dependent on each other.

2. Munitions and Equipment

For obvious strategic reasons, there is no clearly available data outlining the exact amount of munitions, weapons and materials purchased by the Canadian military from United States suppliers. In the absence of such information, I rely on public comments and available data from both the United States and Canada to demonstrate the extent to which Canada is dependent on procurement from the United States. Most notably, in this case, is commentary provided by Prime Minister Carney, who highlighted that approximately 80% of Canada’s defence purchases come from United States vendors.7 Crucially, even amidst rising tensions between the two powers, the Canadian military has continued to advocate for the procurement of equipment from the United States. Following the introduction of tariffs by the United States, the Canadian armed forces have continued to push for the procurement of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) from the American firm Lockheed Martin.8 This follows on from a significant investment in purchasing US military goods in 2023, when the Canadian government ordered close to 30 billion in new equipment, predominantly from US suppliers. While not a detailed assessment of the figures, these serve as a clear indicator of the direction of defence based supply chains, with the overreliance on US vendors posing a clear threat to Canada.

Beyond the issue of supply chain overreliance, there is an additional strategic concern that comes from procuring such a large portion of equipment from the United States, which is the ability for these external vendors to control key elements of the equipment through software. Two critical examples of this are the recently purchased F-35 fighter jets and the Canadian Surface Combatant warships.

Canada’s initial commitments to purchasing the American made F-35 jets can be traced back to 2010, with significant controversy having emerged in the next 15 years around whether it represented the ideal solution for the country’s needs. At present, Canada has legally committed the funds to purchase 16 of the 88 F-35s that it had intended to.9 While much of the discourse has focused on the F-35’s suitability to arctic conditions as well as the estimated costs associated with this procurement, there exist distinct national security considerations associated with this potential purchase. Notably, the United States currently does not allow foreign powers to have access to the original software code that is used to operate the various systems on the F-35. Moreover, foreign entities that are sold F-35s are expressly prohibited from attempting to make changes to this codebase without the involvement of the United States. Most notably, the United States holds a monopoly over code that is critical to the ability of an F-35 to counter enemy radar systems as well as its air defence systems.10 The ability to control such software creates a key security vulnerability that can be exploited by the United States in the case of a conflict. Beyond these software concerns, procurement of F-35s leaves the Canadian air force dependent on the United States for spare parts, maintenance and modernisation efforts - all of which contribute to the existence of a security vulnerability.

Given these considerations, the Carney administration has called for a strategic review of the F-35 procurement, with the goal of determining whether it represents the best possible purchase to preserve Canada’s territorial sovereignty and interests. Crucially, there does exist an alternative. Notably, the Saab Gripen has been seen as a viable alternative, which finished second in the government’s internal competition.11 While the strategic review is currently ongoing, news reports from sources within the government have pointed to the fact that Canada’s military has pushed significantly for the government to maintain its purchases of the F-35s, despite the prevalence of these existing vulnerabilities. The push from the military for these aircrafts, therefore, serves as another reminder of the manner in which the historic relationship between these two armed forces has evolved into a vulnerability for Canada.

Similar concerns to the F-35s have also emerged in the case of Canada’s new Surface Combatant Warships. The command systems implemented within these ships have been procured from the United States, and concerns remain around the reliance on the United States for spare parts, repairs and maintenance.12 Despite these concerns, however, the government is moving forward with its purchase of these ships and the U.S. based command systems.

3. Information, Surveillance Systems and Digital Systems

A third vertical wherein there is significant interoperability between the Canadian and American military forces is in the case of information sharing and surveillance systems. The existence of information flows and the reliance on American surveillance apparatuses create a key point of failure for the Canadian military in a situation of American aggression. In the case of monitoring equipment, the aforementioned NORAD serves as the site where Canadian forces collaborate with the United States to jointly use equipment for surveillance purposes.

In addition to these surveillance considerations, an oft less spoken about concern is the susceptibility of the Canadian military to digital and cybersecurity attacks. Evidence from 2019 has suggested that around 80% of Canada’s internet traffic is routed through communications lines and infrastructure that is situated within the United States.13 This presents two challenges. Firstly, data that is routed through the United States faces the possibility of surveillance from US agencies such as the NSA. Secondly, and more importantly, in a hypothetical scenario of American aggression, the United States has the ability to critically affect communications and data sharing pipelines within Canada by taking action domestically. While not strictly a military dependence, it is easy to see how such a heavy dependence can have a substantial effect on the military strength and capacity of Canada - with vulnerable communication and data sharing pipelines affecting military coordination.

4. Training and Knowledge

A final vertical of consideration is Canada’s dependence on the United States for training services and knowledge building. Canada’s military forces have a substantial history of collaborating with the United States around matters of training - the culmination of which serves to strengthen the bond between the two entities, making the possibility of separation more difficult. A key example of this can be seen in the case of the Canada-U.S. Bilateral Training Strategy, signed in 2022.14 The strategy attempted to set firm milestones around interoperability of operations and training between Canadian and United States forces. Beyond this formal agreement, the United States and Canada often undertake joint exercises with the goal of strengthening cooperation and interoperability between the two groups. For example, Canada deployed over 400 members of the Canadian Armed Forces to Alaska to engage in joint exercises focused on the Arctic with the American military between February and March of 2022. Similarly, Canada sends about 500 military personnel to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana to practice joint exercises and undertake training with the United States military.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is clear that there exists a multitude of verticals wherein the interoperability that characterises the relationship between the Canadian and United States militaries - which was once seen as a strength - could become a strategic vulnerability. While this analysis provides a starting point to consider these challenges, there is a need for more empirical, data driven evidence to truly assess the risk parameters and levels associated with Canada’s current dependence on the United States military.

1 Department of National Defence, “Canada’s New Government Is Rebuilding, Rearming, and Reinvesting in the

Canadian Armed Forces,” Government of Canada, June 9, 2025,

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/06/canadas-new-government-is-rebuilding-rearm

ing-and-reinvesting-in-the-canadian-armed-forces.html

2 Department of National Defence, “North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD),” Government of

Canada, June 22, 2022,

https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/north-american-aerospace-defense-commandnorad.

html.

3Andrea Charron, “Amid Tumultuous Times, NORAD Needs a Consistent Canada-U.S. Commitment,” The

Conversation, January 5, 2023, https://doi.org/10.64628/AAM.du6tduykf.

4 House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, Canada and the Defence of North America (41st

Parliament, Second Session, 2015),

https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/412/NDDN/Reports/RP8046688/nddnrp13/nddnrp13-e.pdf.

5 James Cudmore, “Canadian Military Ponders Integrated Force with U.S. to Respond to Hotspots,” CBC News,

September 28, 2015,

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-canadian-us-integrated-force-1.3247362

6 James Cudmore, “Canadian Military Explored Plan to Fully Integrate Forces with U.S.,” CBC News, September

30, 2015, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-military-integration-canada-us-1.3248594.

7 David Pugliese, “Carney Vows to Retool Canada’s Weapons Sourcing amid Trump Threats,” Name, Defense News,

May 1, 2025,

https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2025/05/01/carney-vows-to-retool-canadas-weapons-sourcing-a

mid-trump-threats/.

8 David Pugliese, “Canadian Forces Pushing for Sole Source Deal for U.S. Weapons as Trump Continues Attacks on

Canada,” Ottawa Citizen, March 14, 2025,

https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/canadian-forces-sole-source-u-s-weapons-trump.

9 Reuters Staff, “Canada’s Defence Review Makes Case to Stick with F-35 Jets: Report,” Global News, August 7,

2025, https://globalnews.ca/news/11322472/f-35-canada-defence-review-jet-purchase-report/.

10 “Canada Is Worried All Its F-35 Can Be Disabled With a Push of a Button in Washington: How Realistic It Is,”

Defence Express, March 7, 2025,

https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/canada_is_worried_all_its_f_35_can_be_disabled_with_a_push_of_a_button_in_washington_how_realistic_it_is-13760.html.

11 Murray Brewster, “Canada Reconsidering F-35 Purchase amid Tensions with Washington, Says Minister,” CBC

News, March 14, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/f35-blair-trump-1.7484477.

12 David Pugliese, “Having U.S.-Controlled System Running Canada’s New Warships Too Risky, Warns Former

Navy Commander,” Ottawa Citizen, February 21, 2025,

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/u-s-system-canadas-war-ships.

13 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, “Evidence,” House of Commons, Chamber of

Commerce, March 18, 2019,

https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/secu/meeting-152/evidence?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

14 Canadian Army, “Canadian, U.S. Armies Sign off on Bilateral Training Plan,” Government of Canada, March 9,

2022,

https://www.canada.ca/en/army/news-publications/2022/03/canadian-us-armies-sign-off-on-bilateral-training-plan.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Aman Nair