Rethinking Nonviolent Defence for the 21st Century

Richard Sandbrook

Nonviolent defence, also known as civilian-based defense, civilian defence, and social defence, has a long history as an idea and a practice. As for practice,  improvised instances have occurred throughout recorded history, including the American anti-colonial rebellion (1765-1775).

As an idea or strategy, nonviolent defence (NVD) has had notable advocates for more than a century. Bertrand Russell contended, in 1915, that a country could resist invasion through a concerted strategy of noncooperation and “passive resistance.” Mahatma Gandhi advocated nonviolent resistance to Nazi aggression in the 1930s. Martin Luther King suggested, in the 1960s, that “the philosophy and strategy of nonviolence become immediately a subject for study and … experimentation in every field of human conflict, by no means excluding the relations between nations.” NVD received considerable theoretical and activist attention during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath - the demise of the Soviet Union and independence of former Soviet dependencies. Interest in the concept then declined, as the Russian threat faded and Europe took shelter under NATO’s nuclear umbrella.

Today, we have extraordinarily little to show for all the advocacy and spontaneous practice. Yes, “civil defence,” as part of “Total Defence” or “Universal Defence,” is widely practiced in the countries bordering or close to Russia. Civil defence, however, is a pale shadow of nonviolent defence.

Yet interest in NVD is again on the rise in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Contributing to this renewal of interest are the loss of confidence in the Trump regime as ally, good neighbour, and supporter of democracy, and, in Europe, the perceived expansive designs of Russia.

But what precisely is this defensive system in the 2020s? Can it work in practice? Is it a realistic goal, or rather a romantic idea with no reasonable prospect of adoption? Potential supporters want to be confident they are not wasting their time.

I suggest that NVD is a realistic goal, under certain conditions. I make this case by reflecting primarily on the work of Gene Sharp, the foremost proponent of “civilian-based defense” (CBD) from the 1970s until his death in 2018. Sharp has been referred to as both the “guru” and the “Machiavelli” of nonviolent resistance, as well as the “Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare.”

Although I am a fan of Sharp’s work, I believe Sharp, and those who have followed him, have not articulated a convincing politics of implementation. First, the approach is more-or-less top-down. The goal is to persuade policymakers, in government and the military, that nonviolent defence in not only cheaper and less damaging than a wholly military defence, but also effective and potentially popular. If research and persuasion can lead decision makers to this conclusion, they will experiment with civilian-based defence because it is in the national interest. Secondly, from Sharp’s influential viewpoint, NVD must be a nonpartisan issue, an all-of-society approach. His assumption is that divisions within society are bridgeable, that the vast majority can, and will, accept NVD on patriotic grounds. But what if these assumptions are implausible? Is it still worthwhile for citizens to work to build capacity for NVD?

Governments and militaries are unlikely to adopt NVD - unless they are pushed to do so from below. Sharp’s approach, it appears to me, largely ignores the vested interests, ideological supports, and careers that perpetuate militarism. In addition, NVD poses a threat to governments that empower their people through training and organization in nonviolent resistance. People so prepared might turn these tools on their own government to correct some purported injustice, norm violation, or anti-democratic action. Also, in today’s politically divided societies, NVD will not emerge as a nonpartisan or technical issue. It is likely to be a political issue that engages one section of the population, while others denounce it as a plot.

Bottom-up politics is a more realistic path to implementation, but it is unlikely to be a nationally unified project. Institutions of civil society with a proclivity for NVD can be the first adopters, I argue. And, given the variety of social movements that have already arisen in the 21^st century to expand the idea of equal freedom, it may be that a much-needed movement for democratic renewal will adopt NVD as one aspect of its broader program. But experimentation in NVD can begin without such a movement.

We might take our cue from George Kennan’s favourable review, in New York Review of Books, of Sharp’s civilian-based defence position in Making Europe Unconquerable (1985). Kennan was a brilliant historian and strategist of the Cold-War era, an establishment figure. In his review, Kennan observes that Sharp succeeded in making civilian-based defence “a thinkable policy,” worthy of further reflection. Why? “If only because of the bankruptcy of all the visible alternatives to it.”

My goal is to show that, today, NVD remains a “thinkable policy,” and beyond that, a policy worth experimenting with. Many things have changed since the 1980s: a lot of key questions remain unanswered; Nonetheless, NVD – and nonviolent resistance more generally - as a system remains a transformative-democratic defence alternative, a breath of fresh air in our toxic contemporary politics. NVD is best understood as, potentially, a mutually-reinforcing, dynamic system. What this means is that civil society can introduce elements of unarmed defence without initial governmental support, in the expectation that synergies will propel the system forward This momentum will press governments and militaries to accommodate the idea. Research funds might then allow researchers to address unanswered issues affecting nonviolent resistance. I propose that it is movement-politics that will build the momentum to experiment nationally with NVD in middle and smaller powers.

What is Nonviolent Defence?

It is a Transformative Policy

The promise of nonviolent defence is to harness the power of civilians and civic associations to deter wars and would-be dictators, and, if deterrence fails, to paralyze and defeat an invader or usurper. Gene Sharp provides a succinct depiction:

The whole population and society’s institutions become the fighting forces. Their weaponry consists of a vast variety of psychological, economic, social, and political resistance and counterattack, to deny the attackers their objectives and to make consolidation of political control impossible. These aims would be achieved by applying massive and selective noncooperation and defiance [and seeking] to create maximum international problems for the attackers and to subvert the reliability of their troops and functionaries.

This definition advances the revolutionary idea that it is the power of society itself, and not just military weaponry and violence, which can deter and defeat invasions and domestic tyrants. Furthermore, NVD achieves these goals at lower cost in terms of casualties and damage than military defence.

Sharp’s insight was to see that tyrants and occupiers, no matter how strong they may appear, are vulnerable. This vulnerability stems from the social nature of power. Rulers or invaders cannot rule without the obedience or cooperation of institutions, functionaries, security personnel, and the population in general. If the pillars supporting a regime withdraw their consent or, better, assent, the regime totters and may collapse. Coercion alone will not work because there are too many ways for hostile people to sabotage a regime: for example, poor and slow work and administration, stay-at-homes, cut-offs of supplies of energy, food, etc., boycotts of certain goods and services, refusal to follow new laws and regulations, sardonic and disrespectful graffiti, protests, street theatre, fraternization with the regime’s soldiers, victim-free sabotage, and ostracism of collaborators with the invaders/tyrant. NVD, and civil resistance more generally, depends on resisters progressing from one to another of three sets of tactics:  symbolic protest, noncooperation and disruption.

Although improvised nonviolent resistance is age-old (in the case of peasants, for example, James C. Scott  refers to many of these nonviolent techniques as “weapons of the weak”), planning, organization and training are conducive to its effectiveness. Government involvement expedites this preparation, but it is not essential. To train people is to empower them. While it is often not true that “people, united, will never be defeated,” it is more likely to be true that people, united - and trained in nonviolent resistance - will prevail.

NVD is a necessarily decentralized, even localized, form of resistance. Hierarchical organization is vulnerable to the sophisticated surveillance technologies that exist today. Tyrants and invaders might well be able to identify and neutralize the nonviolent leadership.

The most effective approach is to rely on the more-or-less autonomous actions of civic institutions, governmental agencies, and individuals organized into affinity groups. But this approach assumes prior planning and training, so that institutions and individuals pursue their own plan, as guided by an overarching strategy. One can imagine plans being shaped by churches, trade unions, professional associations, indigenous peoples’ associations, movements for peace, social justice, and environmental, and climate sustainability, municipalities and regional governments, with each pursuing its plan if the need arises. Affinity groups, with between two and ten members, might bring together friends, relatives, colleagues, or neighbours. Trained beforehand, they would know where to assemble. The idea is that members of these groups have each other’s backs in the event of injury or arrest. No resister left behind. Even with training, however, the opposition would probably remain multifarious owing to the problems of close coordination.

The main constraint would be communications. How would large-scale events such as protests or general strikes be organized? Even some encrypted Internet messages can now be decoded. Also, the Internet itself may be shut down by the despot or invader. Training would need to include discussion on alternative ways of communicating among institutions and groups, if Internet messaging is monitored or prevented.

Although anti-democratic groups can use nonviolent tactics for reactionary purposes, a system of nonviolent national defence is inherently democratic. People will not voluntarily cooperate with one another, spend leisure time on training courses, and risk injury, arrest or even death in civil resistance, unless they believe there is something of value to defend. What matters is the quality of society and its institutions. A just and cohesive society is the best defence against aggression and oppression. The United States, for instance, once had a dense and cohesive civil society. However, as the studies on declining social capital show, the US has experienced reduced civic engagement, heightened social isolation, and declining trust in institutions. An atomized society is more prone to authoritarian takeover, as Americans are now discovering.

In a truly democratic society, people are responsible for their own defence. The decentralized model of NVD devolves considerable responsibility to the local and institutional levels. This non-hierarchical, consultative approach is conducive to a robust democracy, and robust democracy is conducive to nonviolent resistance...

It is a Dynamic System

Nonviolent defence can deter a potential aggressor or tyrant under certain conditions. The main condition is the aggressor/tyrant’s calculation that the defenders can deny him the gains he seeks (glory, the joy of domination, resources) and even subject him to the ignominy of defeat. This calculation depends on the attacker’s perception of the capabilities of the defenders, their degree of unity and determination to resist, and the support the defenders enjoy from allies and friends abroad. Another condition is the willingness of the targeted society to negotiate any genuine grievances. Negotiations may provide an opportunity for the potential oppressor to achieve limited gains at no risk.

Capabilities, on the one hand, and unity and willingness to resist, on the other, are not static qualities; they are mutually reinforcing. Capabilities are shaped by the degree of organization, planning and training of individuals, governmental agencies and civic institutions in nonviolent strategy and tactics. Capability also depends on the resisters’ degree of self-discipline in remaining nonviolent, despite provocation. Importantly, growing capabilities can enhance unity, and vice versa:

[T]he higher the level of instrumental preparation, the more people will be inclined to believe in, and practice, civilian-based defence. Conversely, the greater the evidence that civilians would be ready to mobilize, the more willing the administration would be to invest in instrumental capabilities. Furthermore, the higher the level of mobilization, the more the opponent will note it [and thus the stronger the deterrent].

In sum, the motivation for more people to volunteer, the degree of official support, and the defensive capabilities of society are related, and mutually supportive. Furthermore, the more advanced the organization and scope of nonviolent defence, the more likely that foreign allies and friends will be supportive of a nationally organized and purely defensive strategy.

The crucial point, therefore, is to get nonviolent defence underway, even in a small way. A bottom-up approach in which some civic associations and regional pockets of volunteers organize will gain publicity for the innovative approach and, depending on circumstances, initiate the synergies just identified.

There is, however, one confounding factor. The aggressor or would-be usurper would normally undertake a destabilization campaign prior to an invasion/usurpation. In the case of Canada, a potential target of aggression, this campaign is close to a certainty, and it may already be underway.

The campaign aims to split the population into those who are willing to embrace or compromise with the aggressor/usurper, and those who resist such overtures. The oppressor can then collaborate with some of he former. Destabilization will involve efforts to deepen existing cleavages in the targeted society, discredit NVD leaders, and reduce the will to resist through disruption (threats, cyber-attacks?), misinformation and disinformation, via social media.

The resisters, in response, will seek to resolve national disputes via negotiations to safeguard unity. They must be willing to engage in negotiations with the potential attacker to resolve any genuine grievances, and to inform their people how to identify and resist the destabilization campaign.

This simple depiction of the dynamics of an effective NVD identifies obstacles that proponents of NVD will encounter under current conditions. Their success will depend upon neutralizing or minimizing the obstacles, while realizing the positive synergies among capabilities, unity and fortitude, foreign support, and deterrence.

It Is not the Same Thing as Civil Defence

To clarify one common misunderstanding, nonviolent defence is a major step beyond what is known as civil defence. Yet the latter is still an improvement on a purely military defence approach.

Civil defence is an incremental policy, instituted by governments. Civilian defence is a transformative policy that governments have been reluctant to institute (but may come to accept).

In Northern Europe and the Baltic states, civil defence is one dimension of what their defence departments refer to as “total defence,” “universal defence” or “all-of-society defence.” The armed forces remain the primary defensive arm, while civilians play subsidiary and supportive roles. Civil defence now aims to mobilize trained citizens to assist in all crises, including those caused by extreme weather, forest fires, and earthquakes.

Civil defence in Northern Europe and the Baltics normally involves:

• Protection of civilians in times of emergency (both “natural” and war-like), with governments providing instructions on preparedness, including first-aid treatments, emergency supplies of food and water, places to seek shelter, evacuation routes, and care of pets.

• Usually, the establishment of a national service corps, constituting a trained military reserve force of volunteers who can be mobilized in the case of a crisis. Finland is the oft-cited case, with a reserve force of 900,000. Canada’s chief of the defence staff called, in 2025, for the creation of a National Service, with an initial target of 100,000 trained reservists, rising to 300,000 over a decade.

• Designation of an official communications channel, normally the public radio broadcaster and/or mobile phone messages.

• Ideas on how to engage in “psychological defence” by learning how to talk to children about crisis situations and to disarm disinformation campaigns, which aim “to sow mistrust and [undermine] our will to defend ourselves.” Government bulletins instruct civilians on how to verify information and consult official sources.

• Instructions on how to recognize and respond to specific emergency alarms, including the notification of a state of war.

• Designation of mustering points for people trained as militia and civil defence volunteers,

• Requirement that all adult residents, all government agencies, regional authorities, municipalities, non-profits and private firms must play their roles in the total defence, including non-cooperation with the enemy, with the understanding (as the Swedish government declares) that “we will never surrender.”

• Establishment of a civil-defence department or corps to organize these various activities.

Civil defence is a positive step. Canada, under threat of annexation, is moving in this direction. Such organization may enhance national unity as well as prepare for crises.

However, NVD/civilian-based defence is a step beyond. It involves, instead of a subordinate role for civilians, at a minimum a joint and coordinated deployment of unarmed and armed defence. In its fullest form, NVD involves the planned, autonomous action of trained civilians to deter and defeat an aggressor/dictator using nonviolent strategies and tactics.

The Viability of Nonviolent Defence

“If the people are ready to defend Latvia, no aggressor will ever dare to attack our country,” recently declared Latvia ‘s Defense Minister. This statement is plausible. The credibility of NVD in the eyes of potential aggressors depends on their calculations of the degree of capabilities, unity and determination of the defenders, and their external support. A united, determined, and prepared population raises the cost of invasion to the would-be invader. Armies are not prepared to deal with indignant, uncooperative, yet unarmed, civilians. NVD not only presents commanders with novel situations, but also the nonviolent courage of defenders may spark admiration and emulation in the aggressor’s home country. Invasion can backfire by stoking civil resistance within the pillars of support of the invader/usurper.

This scenario is plausible; however, it is not possible to “prove” the viability/effectiveness of NVD. What one can do is show it is a “thinkable policy” (in Kennan’s words), well worth - not just thought - but also investigation and experimentation.

Gene Sharp and others attest to its viability in two ways. One is to present extensive qualitative and quantitative research on “rough prototypes” of nonviolent resistance.

Sharp in Making Europe Unconquerable (1984) and in Civilian-Based Defence (1990) refers to many of these prototypes. Improvised NVD, he shows, achieved total or partial success against invaders, occupiers, colonialists, and usurpers. His logic is then to conclude: if these resisters achieved considerable effectiveness acting spontaneously, just imagine how much more effective their defensive actions would have been if the resisters had prior organization, planning and training. This logic is powerful.

Three (among many) exemplary cases of nonviolent defence are Denmark’s response to an invasion by Nazi Germany, the Czech response to the invasion by Warsaw Pact armies to terminate the “Prague Spring” of liberalization in 1968, and the Ukrainian response in the early weeks of the Russian invasion of 2022.  In the Danish and Czech cases, the government realized an armed response to an invasion would be quickly and violently suppressed. They thus side-lined the armed forces and called upon their citizens to engage in nonviolent resistance. The spontaneous actions in all three cases achieved some remarkable successes. In Ukraine, the initial and inspiring unarmed resistance was soon negated by battles between conventional armed forces.

Quantitative research in academia also provides support for NVD. (It is to Sharp’s credit that he helped make nonviolent action/civil resistance a legitimate topic for scholarly debate.) Consider the work of Harvard’s Erica Chenoweth. In Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know, Chenoweth records 627 rebellious campaigns against tyranny or colonial or foreign rule during the period. 1900-2019. More than half of these campaigns that were nonviolent succeeded, whereas only about a quarter of violent uprisings achieved their goals. Since 2010, however, Chenoweth notes that the success rate of nonviolent actions has fallen. Governments became more adept at countering standard nonviolent tactics through “smart repression;” new tactics needed to be invented.

The second way to suggest the viability of NVD is by reference to the coherence, versatility, and complexity of the theory it rests on. In summary form, I have made this presentation above. A deeper analysis, for which I do not have space, would probe the strategic objectives and variety of tactics to achieve these goals. Sharp identifies 198 tactics; Michael Beer, 340. The taxonomies are impressive – for those who are open to being impressed – but also intimidating in their complexity.

If a vast disparity exists in the resources directed to military compared to civilian defence, the latter will continue to appear undeveloped. While hundreds of millions of dollars and Euros are devoted each year to research and development in military defence and strategy, no official money (as far as I am aware) has been dedicated to NVD in the 21^st century. Dozens of well-financed thinktanks concentrate on military defence. None, apart from several volunteer-supported organizations in Europe, the USA and Canada, investigate and advocate civilian defence. In addition, a few academics continue their individual studies of aspects of the subject. It is any wonder that citizens and policymakers conflate defence with military defence?

Owing to the limited research, several critical issues concerning nonviolent defence remain unresolved. This situation allows military analysts to ignore NVD or dismiss its proponents as naïve proponents of fringe ideas. Yet Kennan, a brilliant Cold-War strategist, concluded that NVD was a thinkable strategy. Before we can confirm that judgment, and push beyond it to establish NVD as a viable alternative, we need research and debate on the following questions.

• How would the joint deployment of armed and unarmed defence work effectively? It is ridiculous to expect a sudden leap from armed to unarmed defence. Okay. But the problem with joint deployment is obvious: one form of defence succeeds by inflicting grievous bodily and material harm on the enemy; the other works by posing no physical threat while resisters employ tactics of protest, noncooperation and disruption. Could a geographical separation of the disparate strategies be effective? Could the military defence force be trained also in nonviolent resistance? Much more thinking is needed on this key issue.

• The oppressor (usurper or invader) will seek to divide and rule the targeted society and undermine its determination to resist. Social media, manipulated with the use of artificial intelligence, will spread disinformation and lies to deepen existing societal cleavages and exploit anger and hate. We know from experience that such methods are effective in vitiating trust and solidarity. How do we counter the algorithms? Civil libertarians and some tech experts are pushing for stronger privacy laws and controls on police use of surveillance technology. These regulatory efforts seem well worthy supporting. Can we also begin in elementary school, with part of the curriculum devoted to training children to identify disinformation? Disinformation techniques should presumably form part, too,  of the training in NVD. What else can be done?

• “Smart repression,” including the modern technologies of surveillance, have been effective in inhibiting civil resistance since the 2010s, according to Erica Chenoweth. Surveillance technologies have much improved, including facial and voice recognition programs, tracking programs, and software to decode encrypted Internet communications. Crowd-control techniques, such as concussion grenades, electroshock weapons and water cannons, have also improved. Part of the answer to such surveillance and repression is the decentralization of NVD. When institutions, governmental agencies, and affinity groups define their own roles, they can operate autonomously to some degree. When faced with severe repression, resisters will shift even more toward localized actions such as boycotts, symbolic resistance, slow-downs, stay-at-home strikes, and non-compliance with decrees. However, a communications problem will arise when coordinating larger-scale disruptive activities. A high priority issue is to assure secure encryption of messages and agree on alternative channels to the Internet. In addition, units adept at handling cyber attacks would be needed. Technological innovations in surveillance, repression and cyber attacks demand more attention.

• Recent developments in weapons systems raise new challenges for unarmed defenders. Might drones and automated weapons be used to kill unarmed defenders? If so, would such automated violence against the nonviolent obviate the demoralizing effects on soldiers who hitherto had directly administered beatings, arrests and worse? And how would passive supporters react? Would such cold-blooded violence backfire, driving the passive into active support of NVD? Or would it produce paralyzing fear among potential resisters, keeping them on the sidelines?

• Suppose nuclear weapons are in the armoury of an opponent. Would they serve as a deterrent even to unarmed defence? NVD negates the logic of mutually assured destruction. It is purely defensive; a country deploying this defence presents no threat to the nuclear power. Would that power nonetheless deploy its nuclear weapons to intimidate defenders? It seems unlikely. Not only would the radioactivity prevent the aggressor from seizing land and resources, but the attack might lead to blowback in the form of clouds of radiation descending on friends or even inducing a “nuclear winter.” Whatever the probabilities, nuclear disarmament must remain on the agenda.

• What role should intelligence agencies play in NVD? Good intelligence is important to effective planning by unarmed resisters. Will intelligence analysts be sympathetic to NVD or hostile? Who will be responsible for intelligence and its circulation?

• The effectiveness of NVD depends on the active and informed involvement of a substantial part of the population, and their continued unity of purpose. This fact raises several questions that need further research and reflection. How do the NVD proponents overcome the apathy and lack of understanding of nonviolent techniques that would limit the number of volunteers? Training, after all, requires more than one or two short sessions. Will a majority be willing to cooperate? What demographic groups are most receptive to unarmed defence, and which are less receptive? Can influencers and celebrities be persuaded to exert their influence on behalf of NVD? Since people under thirty historically play a key role in civil resistance (think of their involvement in the resistance to the Gaza genocide), will they join in? What forms of social ostracism can be effectively deployed against collaborators? What is the optimal size of affinity groups? Indeed, how well can institutions, such as religious organizations and trade unions, operate independently to fulfil their preset objectives? What is the most effective curriculum for training volunteers, and how long will the course take?

This list of questions is lengthy, to be sure. But to move NVD from a thinkable policy to a worthy strategic concept, and beyond that to an implementable defence system, we need to find persuasive answers concerning its viability. And the answers must be accessible, not technical. To gain a popular following, NVD needs to be presented in a way that makes its strategic power evident in a few words. In today’s fast-paced world, the challenge is not only to be well-informed, but concise and enticing as well.

Confronting Political Realities

Providing arguments for the value and potential viability of NVD are important, but they will not assure its implementation. Treating NVD as a technical policy issue has proven ineffectual. A program without a plausible political strategy is just wishful thinking. Obstacles such as political polarization and the opposition of the military-industrial-intellectual complex are not going to fade away in the face of rational arguments. Bottom-up advocacy and adoption are needed.

Gene Sharp, foremost proponent of “civilian-based defence” from the late 1970s, assumed, first, that (what I call) NVD is a policy issue that would be decided mainly on its technical merits. Refer to ch.3 (“The Transarmament Process”) of Making Europe Unconquerable (1985) and ch.4 (“Transarmament: Changing Over to a CBD System”) of his theoretical tome, Civilian-Based Defense (1990). He treats political and military leaders as rational decision-makers who are guided by the national interest. They engage in a sort of cost-benefit analysis. If these leaders calculate that CBD is potentially not only less costly (in damage, casualties, and annual expenditures) than armed defence, but also effective and popular, they will agree to experiment with it. “Transarmament”, Sharp suggests, is the process of gradually shifting defence from military weapons to decentralized, nonviolent strategy and tactics.

The role of CBD advocates is thus primarily to get the strategy and tactics right through research on historical instances of (spontaneous) civilian defence. Proponents would also need to work out a decentralized organizational structure for this defence system and emphasize the importance of planning and training of civilians.

Although, implicitly, implementation is mainly a top-down process for him, Sharp is too astute to ignore politics entirely. He does mention that public pressure might push recalcitrant governments toward civilian-based defence, and that igniting discussion of CBD in civil society is important.

Sharp is on firm ground on the costs of military defence Our contemporary reliance on armed, defence not only sucks huge and increasing resources from important social and ecological priorities but also threatens widespread slaughter and damage. These dangers are inherent in conventional warfare, let alone a nuclear-weapon attack. Most countries in the Global North either have their own nuclear weapons or are allied with a country that does. We have so far been lucky in avoiding an accidental or intentional nuclear war. Even a minor nuclear exchange would set off a “nuclear winter,” with millions dying from famine. To avoid the expensive and potentially devastating consequences of competitive nuclear and conventional weapons modernization, we need an alternative approach.

Not only is NVD potentially cheaper and less damaging than armed defence, but also scattered historical evidence, referred to above, suggests its effectiveness as a deterrent and defensive strategy. If the civilian effort is planned, organized, and based on training, its efficacy.is enhanced.

Nonetheless, lower costs and potential viability have proven insufficient to budge decision-makers to invest in, and experiment with, NVD (except briefly in a few small countries in Eastern Europe.)

Sharp’s second assumption is that NVD would be most effective if citizens regarded it as a nonpartisan (or “transpartisan”) issue. If nearly everyone accepts this defence system as a patriotic duty, it will triumph. This view assumes that ideological differences are malleable and surmountable.

Neither of these assumptions is realistic under current circumstances. The technical approach to implementation is problematical.

In the first place, military-based defence is entwined with powerful economic and political interests and underpinned by a culture of violence. That is not to say that spontaneous recourse to NVD will not happen from time to time. Civilians have resorted to nonviolent action when faced with an overwhelming invasion or oppression in the past. That happened in Denmark in 1943 when the German armies invaded, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the Warsaw Pact armies moved to crush the Prague Spring, and in the first weeks of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Such spontaneous examples are likely to recur as a “natural” response of invaded populations. However, official endorsement of nonviolent defence. stemming from a positive technical appraisal. is improbable.

First, the military-industrial-intellectual complex would strongly resist NVD. President Dwight Eisenhower warned the American public, in 1961, about the “military-industrial complex.” The President spoke of the “disastrous rise of misplaced power” resulting from the partnership between the military and defence contractors. Today, it would be more correct to refer to a “military-industrial-intellectual complex” (MIIC).

The word “complex” refers to the myriad links among armed forces leaders, industries producing weapons and ancillary services for the military and paramilitary, the multitude of lobbyists for these firms, legislators and bureaucrats overseeing defence, and the well-funded intellectuals/consultants in thinktanks and universities. The role of the intellectuals is to produce arguments, research and policy papers that explain and justify new weapon systems, strategic direction, and the framing of national security as military defence. Countries devote hundreds of billions of dollars annually to military procurement and strategic studies, and defence budgets are expanding. The interests of these diverse components of the “complex” are intertwined.

All these groups would suffer losses if a government shifted to experiment with nonviolent defence. Defence contractors (for example, Lockheed Martin, Northrop-Grumman, General Dynamics, Alphabet, Google, Microsoft) would lose contracts as defence budgets shrink. Their lobbyists (for example, Hill + Knowlton, Samuel Associates) would forego lucrative lobbying fees. Retiring generals, legislators and defence bureaucrats could not depend on the “revolving door” to land them well-paid jobs in private defence contracting and consulting firms. Intellectuals in think-tanks (for example, RAND Corporation, Atlantic Council, Hudson Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies) and universities would see their contracts dwindle or begin studying nonviolent methods. The think tanks themselves would fade in significance and funding. Legislators would not receive campaign donations on which they had come to depend. Well-paid workers in weapons factories would see their jobs disappear, together with their inclination to vote for the local representative. Interests and power underpin military defence. No wonder, then, that influential people ignore NVD, or if the subject arises, dismiss it as idealistic.

And the MIIC is not solely an American phenomenon. It now extends in application even to the smaller countries of NATO (let alone the authoritarian superpowers, Russia, and China). The United Kingdom and France, both nuclear powers, have long hosted their own complexes, with links to their counterparts in the USA. The Royal United Services Institute and Institut de relations internationals et stratégiques have well-established reputations in military circles. Canada is deeply integrated into the US MIIC, purchasing most of its weapons from US defence contractors and engaging its personnel in joint training, military exercises, and unified commands with Americans, such as in NORAD. Canada has a limited roster of its own defence suppliers, mainly in vehicles, ammunition, and aerospace.

There are also some lesser-known military-industrial-intellectual complexes. Spurred by the unreliability of Trump’s America as an ally and the perceived threat from Russia and China respectively, Germany and Japan have shed their postwar pacifist inclinations to rapidly rearm themselves. With government support, defence industries are receiving massive investments. Germany is becoming a major weapons exporter. Again, we observe close links among government, military leaders, and defence firms. Sweden, a small country, has historically sought self-sufficiency in military hardware, in support of its now-relinquished status of neutrality. Firms such as Saab, Bofors, Hagglunds produce advanced jets, artillery, submarines, and military vehicles. Even tiny Lithuania, spurred also by the Russian threat and US indifference, has an expanding MIIC. The country is specializing in high-tech weapons such as lasers, drones, and cyber defence. Again, we find government support for military enterprises, for foreign direct investment in this sector, and for strengthening related research institutions. Militarism is on the rise worldwide.

Popular culture – the glorification of guns, martial heroes, and violence - reinforces the military ethos. Novels, movies, television series, toys, and computer games foster the conception of violence as the means of personal as well as national defence. The veneration of military heroes and gun culture varies from one country to another. One extreme is the Trump regime, which exalts a warrior culture, designates its defence department as the war department, and sanctifies the right to bear arms. The allegedly ever-present menace of “terrorists’ reinforces the military mindset. The exemplary courage of nonviolent resisters, sadly, escapes public notice.

In the second place, the idea of NVD as a non-partisan concern of all citizens is not realistic. The ideological polarization in most societies is too deep to be bridged by a common commitment to patriotic defence. Even the meaning of what it is to be patriotic is in dispute. Nevertheless, a broad movement of democratic renewal, based on a critique of neoliberalism, may be powerful enough to lessen the appeal of right-wing populism. Nonviolent defence must still be the province of a strong majority, made up of those who oppose fascism, authoritarianism, and great-power imperialism.

A potential aggressor seeks to deepen these cleavages in the targeted society before concocting a pretext to invade. The invader vies for the neutrality or  support of a sizable portion of the population. The main tools of destabilization are economic pressure, disinformation and misinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and covert financial support for dissident movements.

Consider, in more detail, the challenges to unity and a coherent response to aggression under current conditions:

• The rise of right-wing populism worldwide: The failures of neoliberalism have spawned popular anger and resentments on the part of those who feel unjustly left behind. Populist leaders have effectively exploited these sentiments, producing political polarization. The far right excoriates an internal enemy: a liberal elite, “socialists,” migrants, ethnic others. The ideological gulf is deep, with each side harbouring animosity toward the other. Proto fascism is a reality of our times.

  
  

Right-wing populists will be tempted to portray NVD as a left-wing or elite-based conspiracy bent on imposing leftist control. Conspiracies are rife on the far right. If that happens, NVD would become a project of those rejecting the authoritarianism,

divisiveness, and corruption of right-wing populism. Their number might include

traditional conservatives as well as those on the centre and left. Patriotism, reform, and anti-fascism may still unite a substantial number in a common project.

• Disinformation and misinformation campaigns: Benyamin Netanyahu has referred to social media platforms as “the most important weapon” in seeking support for Israel in the United States. Social media have become weaponized. They are awash in conspiracy theories and the use of outrage and hate to mobilize support for the far right. Artificial intelligence and “deep fakes” compound the challenge. It is likely that influencers will interpret mass training in the techniques of nonviolent resistance as a leftist conspiracy, a threat to liberty. How can society regulate the algorithms that spread hate and lies?

Implementing nonviolent defence is more complex today than it was in the twentieth century. Mobilizing civil society, in advance of planning, organization and training, is more important than ever.

Movement-Politics: The Way Forward

If nonviolent defence is to have an organized future, which it should, this future depends on movement-politics – social movements framing NVD as one dimension of a larger program of democratic renewal. As Kennan acutely observes in his review of Making Europe Unconquerable, civilian-based defence might have broader societal effects than those relating to national security He wonders “whether many other things might not also change, and, in the main, usefully so.” Precisely. NVD is not a conventional, discrete policy.

It is not far-fetched to envision nonviolent defence as an aspect of a movement for social and political change. We live in an era of movement-politics.

Several social movements have recently flared into existence, had some societal effect, and then faded away (or merged with a subsequent movement). Movements having global impact include:

• the anti-globalization movement (circa 1999-2010), with its multi-faceted critique of corporate-driven (neoliberal) globalization,

• the Occupy Movement (2011-2013), with its focus on wealth and political inequality and the “1%,”,

• Black Lives Matter (circa 2013-2020), protesting systemic racism and police brutality,

• MeToo Movement (2006 – present), exposing and opposing sexual harassment and sexual assault, with the hashtag #MeToo appearing on social media in 2017, and becoming a global rallying point against sexual exploitation,

• Climate Justice, especially in support of a Green New Deal (apogee 2018-2020), and

• global movement against the ongoing, systematic devastation in Gaza (2023-present).

A tradition of movements advocating democracy, anti-imperialism, human rights, and/or equality exists. NVD, with its dual focus on deterring and defeating domestic tyrants and foreign invaders, is a compelling extension of some of these ideas.

Although advocacy of the potential benefits of NVD among legislators and relevant bureaucrats is useful, proponents might fruitfully focus much of their attention on those civil-society organizations having an affinity with nonviolent action. Familiarizing potentially sympathetic elected leaders with the promise of NVD prepares the ground. The main approach, however, should be to enlist natural allies in civil society in adding NVD to their stated goals. In addition, they might train interested members in nonviolent resistance and devise their own plan of action in the event of an invasion or attempted coup. Gene Sharp in 1990 (Ch 2) noted that resistance would be most effectively organized through the institutions of civil society, including municipalities, which were already oriented to collective action. What I am suggesting is that these organizations could prepare for nonviolent resistance even before central governments had adopted the strategy.

Pressure from below would motivate hesitant governments to take nonviolent defence seriously. Taking the idea seriously is a prerequisite for devoting resources to the unresolved challenges of NVD, particularly how to effectively coordinate armed and unarmed defence strategies. Experimenting with NVD on a community/municipal basis would logically follow.

Of course, this strategy is best designed for societies in which civil associations and local governments are independent of central control. The stronger the democracy and the denser the civil society, the more feasible is nonviolent defence from below.

Concretely, what civic organizations have an affinity for nonviolent resistance, and might be recruited into pressing for, and planning for, this strategy? Jorgen Johansen and Brian Martin, in their excellent book, Social Defence, suggest a few, to which I have added others:

• The peace movement: The anti-war and anti-militaristic stance of peace organizations make them natural advocates of NVD. The main problem is gaining the attention of a fragmented and contentious movement.

• Religious organizations: Values of nonviolence are consonant with the values of most religious organizations. Many of them might be ready to endorse and implement NVD, except for certain conservative denominations among Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Religious organizations can preach nonviolence.

The labour movement: Not all trade-union federations and individual unions would be sympathetic, as many workers have opted for right-wing populist parties. Civil-service unions are of particular significance as they could decide, in advance, how to impede control by a would-be tyrant or aggressor. What are the essential services to be maintained for the population, and which ones can be shut down? As slow downs, strikes, protests, and sabotage are key tactics in NVD, workers and their unions could play a decisive part in the event of an attack.

• The environmental movement: Many environmental organizations are accustomed to nonviolent action to make their voices heard, whether through well-organised climate marches or more militant actions in protecting old-growth forests or other ecologically sensitive assets. In addition, the high carbon emissions of militaries, together with the horrendous environmental damage perpetrated by war, incline environmentalists to support NVD.

• Social-justice movements: Indigenous organizations, women’s organizations and racial-justice groups may recognize an affinity with NVD, together with good reasons to obstruct would-be dictators or invaders. All have had experience with nonviolent tactics, if only via orderly protest marches and boycotts, though often much more.

• The youth movement: There is not a youth movement as such. However, contrary to popular perceptions in the West, Gen Z played a major role in leaderless protests throughout the world in 2025. The global South felt their impact the most: in nonviolent protests in Nepal, Madagascar, Indonesia, Philippines, Morocco, Peru ,and Kenya. Socio-economic distress was the main motivator. But youth were also present in the recent protests in France, Italy, Spain and Serbia. In global movements, youth have also played a key role in such nonviolent actions as the anti-globalization movement, Occupy, Bernie Sanders’ primary campaign, Black Lives Matter, ecological campaigns, and opposition to the Gaza genocide. Opinion polls in Europe and North America suggest that many young white men have gravitated to far-right movements. In consequence, Gen-Z women play a disproportionate role in protest actions. It is impossible to imagine NVD working effectively anywhere without the energy and commitment of people under 30.

  Liberal democracy, in tandem with neoliberal polices since the late 1970s and the rise of right-wing populism, is suffering a crisis of legitimacy. The causes are complex, including the growth of vast inequalities, the role of social media in spreading outrage and hate, and the expansion of in-migration, both legal and non-legal. This confluence of circumstances, made worse by climate change, has provided an opening to right-wing populism and its cousin, fascism. Social movements promoting justice issues, equality, human rights, ecological sustainability, peace, and non-violence are part of a larger movement for rejuvenation of democracy. This movement builds on earlier struggles. It is a conducive environment for the propagation of nonviolent defence.

  
  

  Conclusion

So where do we stand in the struggle for NVD in 2026?

Nonviolent defence is not going to displace armed defence any time soon in Europe or North America. Yet it is realistic to work for joint deployment of the two strategies. This approach will save money – NVD, with its volunteers, will not be expensive while military- expenditures gradually decline. It also potentially offers a more effective defence against despotism and aggression than armed defence alone. However, the role of NATO would need to be reassessed.

Consider Canada, my home country, which is under serious threat of annexation. Could Canada dispense with the military? NVD could certainly play an important role in the southern regions in paralyzing and demoralizing an occupational force, via protests, complete noncooperation, and disruptive, nonviolent acts such as strikes. Nonviolent resistance would make occupation hell for the Americans. But Canada would still need a navy or coast guard to patrol its lengthy shorelines to the east, west, and north. NVD would be ineffective in the Arctic because of the dearth of population. We surely need an armed force there, together with submarines, icebreakers, aircraft, and patrol ships, to safeguard Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. And there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, which requires expert units to counter. Intelligence services would remain important. The probability is that, in Canada, we will have to learn how to jointly deploy unarmed and armed defence in an effective, coordinated way.

The strategic details of coordinating such divergent forms of defence needs careful study. It is conceivable that volunteers in Canada’s new National Service, for example, would receive training in nonviolent as well as armed defence. In that case, the initial nonviolent defence against an invasion or coup would be reinforced with trained volunteers from the Service.

How politically feasible is such a joint-deployment approach? The policy is still unthinkable among political and military elites in NATO countries, except in the countries bordering Russia. The more entrenched becomes a military-industrial-intellectual complex, the greater the resistance to nonviolent defence. A lot of work will need to be done in official circles and civil society to shift NVD to a “thinkable” and doable strategy.

NVD advocates must, however, be careful not to confuse civil defence with civilian-based defence, even though the former is an advance over solely military defence. Whereas civil defence casts civilians as merely supplementing the armed forces, nonviolent defence conceives of civilians as, to some degree, supplanting armed force, while, in other arenas, complementing a military response.

The technical case for NVD remains the same as it weas in the late twentieth century. Its development is in the national interest because it is less damaging, more efficient, and a potentially effective form of defence compared to a wholly military defence. It also provides protection against domestic would-be tyrants – a considerable benefit in this age of far-right extremism. However, I have suggested, several questions concerning the efficacy of NVD and its relationship to the armed forces need research, wide discussion, and the articulation of national strategies, based on the circumstances of each country. These reflections will shift NVD from a thinkable idea to an implementable one.

Yet proponents cannot rely on governments, on their own volition, to take this major step beyond civil defence to nonviolent defence. NVD has not, and is unlikely to be, the outcome of a process in which governments and militaries agree, on the grounds of a cost-benefit analysis, that this alternative is superior to reliance on the military alone. Military defence, including nuclear deterrence, is a system undergirded by powerful economic, career and political interests and by intellectual justifications offered by well-financed thinktanks. The military-industrial-intellectual complex is not going to fade away; it will resist.

For this reason, NVD advocates will need to focus primarily on civil society’s institutions and a bottom-up implementation strategy. It is conceivable, given this century’s history of social movements, that a movement for the rejuvenation of democracy will emerge, of which NVD is one dimension. Even without that overarching movement, we can work at the level of civil associations and community government to begin the process of accepting, and implementing, civilian defence. This approach will build pressure on governments to take NVD seriously.

The important thing is to start the process. There is a synergistic relationship among the capabilities of citizens in nonviolent methods, the unity and determination of the population, foreign support, and the calculations of potential aggressors or despots. We must begin the process to realize the mutual reinforcement among capabilities, unity, foreign support, and deterrence. Governments will engage as the process proceeds from below.

We live in a decisive decade for humanity and other species. We need to act on several fronts. Nonviolent defence, in reinforcing the power of citizens, buttresses not only our external and domestic defences, but also the possibility of tackling deep-seated ecological, social, and economic issues. As George Kennen suggested 45 years ago, with the adoption of nonviolent defence, “many other things [besides defence] might not also change, and, in the main, usefully so.”

Richard Sandbrook is Vice-President of Science for Peace and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Toronto.