Failure in Iran and the Potemkin option
John Duncan
In his February 28, 2026 announcement of the likely illegal US-Israeli war against Iran, Donald Trump outlined four strategic goals.
1. “We are going to… raze their missile industry to the ground.” However, three months into the war, given the effectiveness of Iranian missiles and drones hitting their targets (verified by the BBC and others despite US attempts to block the information), Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said with justification: “America will no longer have a safe place in the region for mischief and… military bases.”
2. “We are going to ensure [their]… terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world.” Yet, more than five months into the war, the Los Angeles Times reported that Iran’s proxy forces constitute “a durable, multifront challenge that Washington and its allies struggle to confront.”
3. “[W]e will ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.” But the war has made Iranian nuclear weapons development more likely because it has resulted in a pro-nuclear supreme leader and sharply increased the incentive to develop a deterrent against future aggression. Thus, a deal to reduce Iranian nuclear ambitions is more distant than when the Obama administration signed such a deal in 2015, which Trump tore up in 2018.
4. And, “to the great… people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand… take over your government. It will be yours to take”—the call for regime change. However, rather than leading to its overthrow, the war has hardened the Iranian regime, largely because of “the prioritization of regime survival over reform” in the face of aggression.
In addition, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, threatening the global economy. The closure affects virtually every country, but Trump’s war of choice brought it about, so reopening it became a fifth strategic goal for the US. Iran has suffered immense damage, but because it retains the capacity to absorb much more and hit back effectively, the US is unable to reopen the Strait by force. Meanwhile, the massive US base and alliance structures in the Persian Gulf region have been damaged and pushed back “from the forward-positioning U.S. forces assumed after the 1991 Iraq war, returning to an ‘over-the-horizon’ presence.”
As a result of failure across the board, the US is no longer able to coerce the Iranians. While Trump bridles and Iran increasingly sets the agenda, a fitful series of negotiations, interspersed with threats, blockades, military strikes, and intensified sanctions, has followed the initial “shock and awe” attack and defensive “blitz.” But none of it has advanced US goals.
According to international relations scholar John Mearsheimer, “The U.S. war against Iran… will be recorded as the biggest mistake in the history of U.S. foreign policy”—a significant claim given the disasters in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
It is also disconcerting to reflect on the prosecution of the war. The US bombed Iran at “a pace of warfare unparalleled in modern conflict”—killing schoolgirls and destroying water storage facilities with precision weapons systems in the process—layered its aggression onto years of US-led population-punishing sanctions, used diplomatic negotiations as cover for lethal attacks, and issued threats of genocidal annihilation—“A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” All of this is only the latest chapter in a long history of meddling in Iran—a history it would be difficult to call honourable.
Although the Iranian regime has been widely criticized for decades, and for good reason, leading Iran expert Trita Parsi argues that “many countries now secretly hope Trump remains stuck in the Persian Gulf for the foreseeable future. It may be the most effective guarantee that his regime-change and annexation spree comes to a halt.” There is a growing sense among officials globally that the US is the greater threat, resulting in “tacit rooting” for Iran.
Although Trump rightly says of the US military, “there is no military on Earth even close to its power, strength, or sophistication,” it has failed in Iran. Nevertheless, he continues to commit good—not to mention dwindling—resources after bad. Perhaps his advisers tell him he can still win if he tweaks the threats, sanctions, blockades, and bombing. But it has all been tried, and repeating the same actions without getting better results is the popular definition of insanity.
Putting insanity aside, Trump’s options come down to either falsely claiming victory and withdrawing or continuing to fight a “forever war.”
Claiming victory to deny defeat is familiar territory. Trump still claims to be the rightful winner of the election more than five years ago, having “asserted that the 2020 elections were ‘rigged’ more than 100 times over the first half of 2026.” However, because the US has not defeated Iran’s missiles or proxies, has failed on the nuclear and regime change fronts, and cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz from its over-the-horizon positions, the evidence of failure in Iran is formidable, even for Trump.
Although Trump campaigned against the widely unpopular forever wars of the recent past, continuing the war in Iran defers the judgement of failure and leaves time for a possible victory. Even though strategic analysis says the US will not win, hope springs eternal, as it did in Afghanistan for two disastrous decades. The downside is that Trump would be tarred with the “forever war” brush.
If the war cannot be won, as many acknowledge, and Trump wants to avoid a forever war, he must claim victory before his presidency ends (even if he is unable to do so before the November midterms). He should have done so after the initial intensive bombing, when he could tout early tactical wins and the analysis of failure was not yet developed. Going forward, he needs time to make a show of US initiative and accumulate new tactical victories. Bellicose threats, severe sanctions, manoeuvres in the Strait, high-profile military strikes—none of which move the needle on strategic goals—help him do precisely that.
This is the Potemkin option. In the late 18th century, Russian statesman Grigory Potemkin wanted to impress visiting diplomats with Russia’s new territories, so he had poor villages temporarily spruced up. His detractors went further, falsely accusing him of constructing attractive village facades for diplomats to view as they toured. As a result, “Potemkin village” became a term for manipulating a negative situation to make it appear positive. Unlike propaganda, which simply calls a negative situation positive, the Potemkin option changes the situation on the ground—not to improve it, but to make it appear improved when it is not.
The implications in Iran are disconcerting. Sacrificing real blood and treasure to win a war is something no one should want to do, but which we sometimes say we must. The Potemkin option, however, sacrifices blood and treasure uselessly when it cannot affect the outcome of the war. It intentionally continues to lose the war, sacrificing blood and treasure to construct a false narrative of victory—that is, to pretend to win the war.
As the 2019 Afghanistan Papers reveal, less than a decade ago, the US and its coalition partners repeatedly claimed to be winning a losing war. Continuing to lose a war in order to pretend to be winning it can only add to the dishonour in Iran.
John Duncan is director of the Ethics, Society and Law program at Trinity College, academic director of the Ideas for the World program at Victoria College, and president of Science for Peace, all at the University of Toronto.
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